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1. Introduction 
In the summer of 1993, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) 
announced that a number of its party members were ‘expelled because they have acted in their 
own interest’ (Indian Ocean Newsletter, 24 July 2016). Almost a déjà vu, the central committee 
of the front has made a similar claim some twenty-three years later, indicating it ‘identified abuse 
of office for private gains as one of the challenges the developmental democratic system has 
been facing’ (FBC, 22 August 2016). At the same time, the regime lauds its achievements of 
economic growth, ethnolinguistic self-determination and formal political participation.  
It is not, however, a sporadic abuse of power by a few members of the elite that characterises the 
political economy of post-1991 Ethiopia, but a systematic emergence of oligarchic politics that 
the ruling party has used to establish and consolidate its position. The TPLF, the core of the 
EPRDF, leads the rest of the parties in the front in building business empires. Thus, the 
Ethiopian economy (or more precisely, its booming sectors) is not just dominated by business 
elites, but also the front’s political elites and ‘other friends of the TPLF’ who were allowed to the 
heights of fortune in the country. This briefing piece attempts to unpack the domains and 
processes of oligarchy in the changing political economy landscape of the Ethiopian state.   
The state’s role in Africa has spurred substantial debate and some argue that it was through 
‘access to the state’ that political influence was acquired (Kawabata 2006, Van Hoyweghen and 
Smis 2002). For Cheru (1989, 12) ‘the real issue in Africa is not the degree to which the state 
intervenes in economic matters, but on whose behalf it intervenes’. In EPRDF’s Ethiopia, the 
‘comeback of ethnic politics’, the rise of ‘a post-Marxist-Leninist vanguard party’ to power, and 
‘economic dynamism’ in consecutive years of economic growth have given the period since 1991 
a special place in contemporary African politics (Hagmann and Abbink, 2011, 579). 
 
2. Wealth creation and concentration in Ethiopia 
Taking these dynamics into account, it is imperative to investigate the nature of wealth 
concentration in a country where the regime boasts annual GDP growth of 11 percent for over a 
decade (MoFED, 2014). According to a long-serving State Minister, responsible for economic 
development and national planning, the Ethiopian economy has gone through two phases over 
the last 25 years (Abraham Tekeste, interview 28 April 2016). The first ten years were an era of 
recovery1 and the later 15 were a period of shared growth. Ethiopia’s economic growth has been 
  
hailed as miraculous and received appreciation from international financial institutions such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
Although Ethiopia’s GDP growth figures are contested, and the IMF estimated annual growth at 
7 to 8 rather than 11 percent (EUI, 2012, 8), observers agree that there has been real GDP 
growth through expansion of the construction and service sectors (Seid et al., 2015). While 
agriculture, which accounted for 42.9 percent of GDP in 2012/13 (EIC, 2104), continues to be 
important as a major source of foreign currency and employment, its contribution to economic 
growth has become more limited.  
The Ethiopian Investment Commission reported that the service sector accounted for 45.2 
percent of GDP in fiscal year 2012/13 (EIC, 2014). The major subsectors responsible for GDP 
growth include commerce (wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants) and public services 
(public administration and social services; education; health and social work). The World Bank 
(2016) estimated that the service sector accounted for about half of economic growth generated 
between 2004 and 2014, and that it has become the second biggest employer; yet, the sector’s 
contribution to poverty reduction is modest.  
The construction sector – especially the roads, water supply and irrigation, power and other 
public works subsectors – is growing fast: the Minister for Construction Minister claims that the 
sector had an annual growth rate of 12.43 percent and is currently contributing over 5 percent to 
Ethiopia’s GDP (Reporter, 17 December 2016; World Bank, 2016). According to the National 
Bank of Ethiopia (2014/15 Annual report), construction accounted for over half of industrial 
production in fiscal year 2015/16.  
 
3. Rise of Oligarchy, 1991-2016   
The nexus between wealth creation and political power is particularly important in the booming 
sectors of construction, wholesale and retail trade. Ethiopia’s economic growth has been fuelled 
by massive public investment and inflows of foreign aid and loans. The proceeds of growth have 
been captured by a minority of politically well-connected businesses and politico-military elites, 
leading to the emergence of oligarchic politics. This confirms Winters’ (2011, 18) expectation 
that wealth ‘sets in motion the politics and processes of oligarchy’. Oligarchy produces the 
politics of wealth defence, which can take different shapes, from involvement in government to 
coercive practices (Winters, 2011; Åslund, 2007).  
Both classical and recent contributions focus the analysis of oligarchy on how wealth is created 
and defended, as well as on the direct and indirect rule exercised by the wealthy. In their study of 
Ukrainian oligarchs, Markus and Charnysh (2017) have shown how oligarchs can be flexible 
while politicians are subjected to electoral battles and their consequences. They concluded that 
‘oligarchs do not expire – politicians do’, pointing out that support of parties and media 
ownership mask and magnify the influence of oligarchs. The context of oligarchic politics in 
Ethiopia offers another dimension to the argument. The direct dimension of rule seems deeply 
entrenched and multiple networks tie the ruling party to the emerging rich. Privatisation, land 
deals, phoney shareholdings and corruption are the main mechanisms of oligarchisation in the 
booming sectors. 
  
 
4. Privatisation  
Privatisation was the first mechanism of wealth concentration that tilted the economic playing 
field under the EPRDF regime. When the regime came to power in 1991, the state owned 211 
manufacturing firms (CSA, 2003; Demissie, 2008). Since the start of the privatisation 
programme, more than 280 enterprises were privatised using different modalities.2 Data show that 
the primary beneficiaries of the privatisation scheme were the Saudi-Ethiopian business mogul, 
Sheik Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-Amoudi, and the ruling TPLF party (CSA, 2003; Hansson, 
2004; Demissie, 2008).  
From the total number of enterprises privatised, MIDROC (Mohammed International 
Development Research and Organization Companies), owned by Sheik Al-Amoudi, took the 
lion’s share by obtaining around 60 percent of all privatised enterprises (Wikileaks, 2008).3 He 
has developed a cosy relationship with the politicians of the regime, which culminated in the 
open support to the ruling party in the 2005 general elections. According to a US embassy cable, 
Al-Amoudi ‘has cherry-picked the best of the companies sold to date’. For example, Legedembi 
is the only large-scale gold mine in the country, and Wushwush is the sole plantation-style tea 
producer’ (Wikileaks, 2008). The Legedembi gold mine purchase in August 1998 (worth 172 
million USD) was one of the most controversial privatisation deals involving MIDROC Gold 
Company (Kebede, 2014). Not only the modality of the transfer of ownership and privatisations 
by the party-state to Al-Amoudi was controversial but also the payments and loan arrangements 
benefiting the sheikh captured the attention of Ethiopian media. It was reported that MIDROC 
has arrears totalling 1.3 billion Birr, which amounts to 60 percent of what the Ethiopian Ministry 
of Public Enterprises had wished to receive for privatised entities (Fortune, September 2016).  
The other primary beneficiary of privatisation is the ruling party, which has been in power for 
the last 25 years and has used its endowment companies to acquire privatised entities (e.g. 
Demissie, 2008). Significant numbers of enterprises were transferred to the party and its elites. 
The business arm of the ruling party grew together with the privatisation programme run by the 
party-state (see further below). 
 
5. Land expropriation   
Urban land for construction of properties and rural land for agricultural investments constitute 
the dominant source of wealth accumulation in post-1991 Ethiopia. Both urban and rural land 
have become critical resources that are serving the politicians very well. Bekele Gerba, one of the 
country’s important opposition leaders, spoke the following famous words in a televised election 
debate: 
As stated in the Ethiopian constitution and as stipulated in the policy document of the 
ruling party, the land belongs to the state and the people. But does the land belong to the 
people? Does it belong to the state? To both? The land belongs to no one but rather 
belongs to the ruling party officials. The ruling elites do whatever they want with it – they 
sell it, exchange it, get a friend with it, distribute it among relatives, and it serves as a 
seduction to recruit party members. Land has even become a tool to blindfold the 
educated, not to speak about justice, rights and equality […]. Today, land is a space-
  
shuttle that the few use to skyrocket to unprecedented wealth with the speed of light 
(EBC, 2010, authors’ translation). 
Gerba emphasised that, under the EPRDF regime, land has become a critical source of wealth 
for politicians and politically-connected business people. Land has become expensive and the 
new rich are now buying land at prices that surpass the value of the land. Stebek (2015, 67) has 
noted that this is ‘a wakeup call regarding the level of lease tender price hike bubbles that can 
occur in a highly imperfect market’.  
As for rural land, the nexus between the domestic land-grab and political connections is not 
difficult to see. For example, the Ethiopian government award of millions of hectares of land to 
investors in Gambella region commenced in 2008 to boost economic benefits (Oakland 
Institute, 2011). This study of Oakland Institute (2011, 23) indicated that, although most media 
attention to land grabs in Ethiopia was related to foreign acquisitions, domestic land deals are 
critical as ‘the vast majority of investors (by some accounts, 95 percent) are domestic and 
account for more than half of the land area leased to investors’. These ‘domestic investors’ 
belong to the TPLF-related Tigray ethnic group and consist of politico-military elites and their 
close affiliates (Oakland Institute, 2011, 23-24). An observer has indicated that ‘similar stories of 
massive acquisition of public resources unjustly acquired throughout Ethiopia by TPLF and 
Tigrians affiliated with the regime are widely circulated’ (Zeleke, 2016).  
 
6. Phoney Shareholding  
The emergence and expansion of party-parastatals is another feature of the political economy of 
oligarchy in EPRDF’s Ethiopia. Party-parastatals – or ‘endowments’ in their household name – 
were mentioned frequently by key informants4. Although the proponents of the Endowment 
Investment Groups (EIGs), such as Arkebe Oqubay (2015), categorically deny that these 
businesses belong to the political party, data point in a different direction. The EIGs make 
EPRDF the richest party in Africa (Abegaz, 2011). The EPRDF is constituted by four political 
parties, and each of them has a business arm in the economy. Different from the West, 
Ethiopia’s ruling party controls a large part of the economy and its core party TPLF is 
successfully presiding over a business conglomerate named EFFORT (Endowment Fund for the 
Rehabilitation of Tigray), established in 1995 (Milkias, 2003, 41).  
TPLF politicians, especially shareholding central committee members, lead the companies as 
board members and CEOs. Independent government organs have not obtained the right to audit 
the endowment companies. Through the endowment companies, members of the political elite 
enrich themselves and exert enormous influence in the economy (Milkias, 2003, 45). Through its 
ownership of 14 different companies, EFFORT is investing in a variety of activities in 
manufacturing, services, merchandise, construction, mining and agriculture (EFFORT, 2016). 
Next to these investment activities, EFFORT has become a major shareholder in many more 
companies.  
In his extensive memoirs, Legesse (2016, 215) uncovers that the political elite and their relatives 
managed to extract substantial wealth from the TPLF business conglomerate. Public enterprises 
were given away to EFFORT for small or no monetary compensation under the leadership of 
Assefa Abreha, head of the privatization board. The public enterprises included Kuraz 
  
Publishers, the historical publishing house established under Ethiopia’s military regime, and 
EDDC (Ethiopian Domestic Distribution Corporation), which was acquired by EFFORT’s 
subsidiary, Guna. Kuraz became Mega, EDDC became Guna, and the process continues in 
which public enterprises change hands from the state to party businesses and individuals. The 
expansion of the EFFORT’s business interests, and consequently the shareholding adventures of 
the politicians, has grown exponentially. It is important to note how TPLF’s business empires 
are intertwined (see also Assefa, 2003; Hansson 2004). 
The various businesses that belong to the ruling party were established mainly through acquiring 
capital and assets though a variety of illegal and semi-legal means (Legesse, 2016, 185-226). 
These include loans-turned-uncollectable, transfer and plunder, fraud and semi-legal activitiess, 
business coercion, collusion and networking. As for loans, the lion’s share (5 billion Birr) of the 
8.5 billion Birr in loans given out by the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) since 1991, was 
given to the Tigray region and its flagship company, EFFORT. Transfers and plunder included the 
looting of banks and channelling of aid to party coffers during the armed struggle, direct 
financial transfers from government bureaus to the party, and the transfer of physical and other 
assets from the state to party businesses. Oft-cited examples of such transfers are the emergence 
of Walta Information Centre and Radio Fana as important media companies, and their 
acquisition of the building and audio-visual archives of Ethiopian Television. These two media 
outlets are the cash-cows of the party and its main propaganda machines. Fraud and semi-legal 
activities concern, among others, the inappropriate waving of taxes for importing vehicles and 
spare parts by EFFORT, which costs the state hundreds of millions of Birr. Coercion is applied as 
an instrument to secure assets and profit. The coercive capacity is built on the capture of key 
positions in ministries and boards that occupy critical roles in the economy.5  
Collusion and networking are used as important instruments for the creation and maintenance of 
party businesses among the companies owned by EFFORT, thus creating synergies that aimed 
to control the ‘value chain’ in markets. The typical practice is that newly established companies 
create a chain of other companies, in which they are shareholders. Some members of the political 
elite obtain a small share in those new companies, and continue to lead the companies. Further, 
various TPLF businesses have created joint ventures with successful Ethiopian and foreign 
businesses, with the purpose of ‘literally squeezing private businesses out of existence’ (Milkias, 
2003, 46). Though the legitimacy and role of the party businesses in Ethiopia have been criticised 
and questioned by many, they continue to grow in various sectors and their economic muscle is 
getting stronger. The most forceful push in this regard (yet again) was the establishment of 
another conglomerate, Dejena endowment, after the 2005 Ethiopian elections. Dejena is made 
up of six companies, most of them focusing on agriculture: Berhu Tesfa Plastic Factory, Michew 
Particle Board, Dema Honey Production, Alage Forestry and Forest Products, National Geo-
textile, Abergele Animal Fattening and Export. Dejena eventually became a subsidiary of 
EFFORT. 
 
7. Corruption 
The capture of wealth by EPRDF elites does not take place only through the practices discussed 
above but also through entrenched corruption practices, which show the nexus between political 
positions and business power. Corruption cases are compelling examples that demonstrate the 
  
concentration of wealth among a limited number of actors. The regime has itself confirmed the 
existence of corruption networks involving politicians and business people, but only a few cases 
were brought to justice. Some of the important corruption cases are discussed in this section. 
 
Customs and tax  
A high-profile corruption case in relation to tax and import-export trade reveals the collusion of 
politics and money, especially in the booming service sector. The corruption case, which was 
started in October 2013, led to the indictment of more than 65 individuals ranging from the 
Director General of the Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority to other high ranking 
officials and their relatives, business people, and freight forwarders (FEACC, 2014; Fortune 
2013, various issues). The charges against customs officials relate to, among others, ‘allowing 
goods to pass through customs uninspected’ (FEACC, 2014). These practices involved 
prominent business companies such as Nyala Motors, Petram Plc, Moenco, GET-AS Trading, 
Alsam Plc, METEC, Ayka Addis Trading, MIE, Holland car, Total Ethiopia, MIDROC, Salini 
Construction, Dire International trading, Ethio-leather, Basefa Trading Plc, GETAS 
international, and Comet Trading House (FEACC, 2014). The business people were charged for 
‘tax evasion through graft’, ‘importing through illegal means’ and ‘selling duty-free imports meant 
for investment’ (FEACC, 2014). The amounts of money involved in these tax evasion scandals 
are enormous compared to the size of the economy (for example, tax evasion by just three 
individuals involved more than 300 million Birr). The indictment process has also shown the 
corruption networks that involved customs officials and their relatives, the business companies 
and tax officials.  
 
Security apparatus 
The secrecy and entrenched corruption within the security apparatus have been exposed by some 
media outlets as well as our respondents (see for example Ayalew, 2016). The most prominent 
case in the security apparatus brought to justice by the regime is that of Mr Woldeselassie 
Woldemichael and his co-defendants. This security chief is known for his brutality and 
entrenched corruption networks but the first charge filed in January 2014 by the Federal Anti-
Corruption Commission relates to the abuse of his position as a security officer and member of 
different boards of public enterprises. He used his access to coerce public printing presses to 
publish 13,000 copies of a book titled Terrorism in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Then he 
‘sold’ the copies to public enterprises and to twenty-six major businessmen in the country, 
although the book was irrelevant to their work.  The charges highlight the involvement of the 
business community and their subjugation to the political and security apparatus of the regime. 
Further, the charges demonstrated how high-profiled security official Woldemichael and his 
family had become millionaires over a short time span, having become the owners of two major 
farming companies as well as large amounts of assets and cash. 
 
The top echelon  
  
The case of Tamrat Layne, which dates back to the mid-1990s, was the first high-profiled 
corruption case in Ethiopia. Tamrat Layne was Prime Minister of Ethiopia during the transition 
period in the early 1990s and later became Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. He 
was charged with abuse of power, embezzlement and corruption. He was eventually found guilty 
of the charges and was sentenced to 18 years of imprisonment. One of the major charges 
brought against Layne concerned the solicitation of a gift of US $16 million USD from Sheikh Al 
Amoudi to the Ethiopian government, part of which was allegedly misappropriated by Layne. 
Further, charges against Layne related to his intervention in a contract involving the supply of 
building materials, which was awarded to Ramis International, whose shareholders included, 
among others, Tamrat Layne’s mother (Indian Ocean Newsletter, various issues).  
 
8. Conclusion  
Private ownership, which had been abolished by the military-socialist regime in 1974, came back 
to life in 1991 when EPRDF took power, although in a different shape. Under EPRDF rule, 
Ethiopia has been growing fast and wealth commenced shaping the character of politics. 
Economic growth has been trumpeted by the World Bank and IMF as miraculous and yet the 
country fails to address basic needs of millions of its people. The country’s reliance on food aid 
has ranged from 8 to 18 million people annually since 2005, making Ethiopia the largest recipient 
of food aid in the world (Oakland Institute, 2016). Seen against this background, the signs that 
wealth is increasingly concentrated among the politically well-connected elite call for a sober 
reflection. 
The country’s political-economy dynamics, revolving around politics, business and wealth 
creation, is possibly leading Ethiopia into troubled waters, where the toxic mix of ethnicity, 
business, and official power is evident. This complex of issues is one of the most urgent matters 
that the country is grappling with. The economic growth, accompanied by urban and rural land 
expropriation, fraudulent privatisation, corruption and politico-business collusion, has facilitated 
oligarchy formation since the 1990s. The implication of this oligarchisation is that it has changed 
the nature of politics in the country. Widening inequality, as oligarchic theory predicts, has led to 
the emergence of a disenfranchised majority, on the one hand, and the search for new 
instruments of wealth defence by the few, on the other. These dynamics have changed the 
character of the Ethiopian economy, particularly related to business and work ethics of the 
young and upcoming entrepreneurs. The possiblity for people to move up in the wealth 
hierarchy is dependent on political networks and blood ties. As Bulcha (interview, October 2015) 
pointed out, ‘If someone is a smart industrialist who has proven himself in other countries and 
came to Ethiopia to invest and he is not a friend of the government, he cannot continue to be 
wealthy.’ Post-1991 Ethiopia is not a simple pyramid with a few rich at the top and millions of 
poor at the bottom, but has turned into a state-sponsored chain of ethnically-tilted capitalist 
relations where party-related companies grow wealthier, seconded by ‘yes-men business people’ 
who benefit from public funds and projects.    
 
  
1 According to Minister Abraham Tekeste, the 17 years of the military regime, after the fall of Emperor Haile 
Selassie (1974-1991), witnessed an annual average growth of 1.9 percent. In that period, population growth was 3 
percent annually, which implied an annual decline of per capita income of 1 percent. The Minister claims that 
currently ‘the people are benefiting from the growth and the sense of fatalism of the old days has gone’ (interview 
28 April 2016). 
2 According to the now defunct Privatisation and Public Enterprises Supervising Agency (PPESA), the programme 
has privatised more than 90 small-scale wholesale and retail shops, 37 state farms, 34 hotels, 31 food enterprises, and 
19 textile enterprises. The rest are in manufacturing, chemical, metal and woodwork, beverages, leather industries, et 
cetera. 
3 Sheik Al-Amoudi is the wealthiest oligarch in Ethiopia, with possessions totaling around US$10 billion (Abegaz, 
2011). Forbes (2017) has recently listed the Sheik as the 43rd richest person in the world. 
4 The key informants are business people, public intellectuals, journalists and others who were interviewed in 2015 
and 2016 in Ethiopia within the framework of a PhD study on the subject. 
5 Office holders use their powers to coerce companies in which the government is a shareholder to sell low-priced 
products to party companies. The most famous case was brought to light during the corruption trial of the former 
Defence Minister. The trial showed that politicians coerced AMICE to sell trucks to EFFORT, at low prices, and 
transfer some 42 trucks for free. The story is detailed in the political memoir of the former Defence Minister Siye 
Abraha himself titled, Netsanetna Dagninet be-Ethiopia [Freedom and Due process of law in Ethiopia]. 
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